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Introduction
Atlantic Philanthropies is a limited-life foundation that has been making grants since 1982
in eight countries. In 2002 the foundation
announced its intention to distribute all of its
assets and close down by 2020; by that point
it will have granted an estimated $7.7 billion
worldwide, the largest exercise in limited-life
philanthropy to date. Atlantic Philanthropies
has described its philosophy in the following
way: “Our goal, simply put, is to do as much
good as possible, for as many disadvantaged and
vulnerable people as possible, as soon as possible” (2005, p. 3). Underpinning this general goal
is a particular focus on tackling global inequalities and injustice. The founder of Atlantic
Philanthropies, Chuck Feeney, imbued the foundation with his personal philosophy of “giving
while living” to achieve profound social change
during his lifetime.
This article will examine Atlantic’s work in
Northern Ireland, where since 1991 it has supported three thematic intervention areas: aging;
children and young people; and reconciliation
and human rights. Across these program areas
some basic working principles applied: tackle
the root causes, rather than the symptoms, of
disadvantage; lever new or match funding for
interventions; and mainstream successful policy and practice across Northern Ireland and
beyond. Atlantic’s funding approach involved
supporting key nongovernmental organizations
to drive and advocate for change. As part of its
exit strategy, Atlantic Philanthropies has moved
to partnering with the power-sharing Northern

Key Points
•• This article is a case study of Atlantic Philanthropies’ work in Northern Ireland, where
it supported three thematic intervention
areas: aging; children and young people; and
reconciliation and human rights. Atlantic, a
limited-life foundation that has been making
grants since 1982 in eight countries, will
close down by 2020 and is engaged in an
exit strategy.
•• Atlantic’s original funding approach involved
supporting key nongovernmental organizations to drive and advocate for change;
its work helped to support and consolidate
the peace process in that country. Its exit
strategy has involved a formal partnership
arrangement with the Northern Ireland
Assembly to take external interventions to
scale and mainstream services previously
funded through NGOs.
•• This article draws on qualitative data
gathered through interviews with key
stakeholders — the funder, government
officials, and NGOs — and considers
the consequences of this approach for
sustaining and mainstreaming policies
and practices. It also offers both specific
and general lessons on partnering with
government as an exit strategy.

Ireland Assembly, a radical shift in both strategic
and operational terms.
Based on reflective practice, this article will
examine Atlantic Philanthropies’ move from a
bottom-up external funder that worked through
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NGOs to a top-down, insider, partnership role
with the government of Northern Ireland. It
will also draw on qualitative data gathered
through interviews with key stakeholders — the
funder, government officials, and NGOs — and
consider the consequences of this approach
for sustaining and mainstreaming policies and
practices. The article concludes with an examination of the lessons learned from partnering
with government as an exit strategy: Atlantic’s
role changed from funding NGOs to advocate
for policy change outside government to one
in which Atlantic is actively collaborating with
government. The aim is to capture the learning
from actors directly involved in the partnership
process. What is offered is a formative overview
of issues considered important by the stakeholders based on early reflections on their experience
with Atlantic’s exit strategy. Interviewees remain
anonymous and no reference is made to their
host departments for reasons of confidentiality; within Northern Ireland’s small policy
community, members could otherwise identify
respondents who gave freely of their time and
opinions in good faith.

The Northern Ireland Context
The context of Atlantic’s work in Northern
Ireland is important in understanding the role
it has played. The island of Ireland was partitioned in 1921, with the southern 26 counties
gaining independence from Britain and the
remaining six counties in the northeast remaining part of the United Kingdom. The new state
of Northern Ireland had a Protestant majority
(roughly 65 percent at the time of partition) and
acquired its own parliament and considerable
autonomy within the U.K. A chronically insecure Protestant majority, an alienated Catholic
minority, electoral malpractice, ethnic bias in
the distribution of housing and welfare services,
and a declining economy meant that the state
could never command full political legitimacy.
During the 1960s a civil rights movement began
to campaign for more equitable access to political
power, social provision, and cultural recognition. It met with resistance and divisions within
unionism — those with allegiance to the U.K.
24 The Foundation Review // thefoundationreview.org

Politics spilled onto the streets. In 1969 the
London government deployed the British army
in an attempt to restore order. By the mid-1990s,
more than 3,500 people had been killed. Between
1974 and the cease-fires of 1994 there were seven
attempts to reach a political and constitutional
settlement. All of the initiatives were Londonled and included an element of power-sharing
between Catholics and Protestants; all foundered
in the face of local opposition. The first moves
toward peace progressed along two parallel
routes: Route one sought to maintain momentum between the constitutional parties; route
two saw the first tentative moves to involve
republicans (supporters of a united Ireland) in
talks. On Aug. 31, 1994, the Irish Republican
Army declared “a complete cessation of military
operations” and the main loyalist paramilitary
organizations followed its example in October,
paving the way to the Good Friday/Belfast
Agreement of April 1998 (Darby, 2003).
The Ulster Unionist Party agreed to share power
with Sinn Fein (the republican political party)
on the condition that it decommission its weapons; Sinn Fein didn’t do so, and the Assembly
(established under the 1998 agreement) was
suspended in February 2002. This fitful process
was to continue, and devolution was suspended
indefinitely for the fourth time by Northern
Ireland’s secretary of state in October 2002 due
to a “lack of trust and loss of confidence on both
sides of the community” (Reid 2002). A political breakthrough came in the form of the St
Andrews Agreement in October 2006. Northern
Ireland has enjoyed a period of political stability
since 2007 and a significant decline in political
violence, although legacy issues around flags,
parading, and otherwise dealing with the past
continue to dog political progress. While regularly described as a post-conflict society, peace
remains fragile not least because of such issues
as the highly segregated nature of Northern
Ireland on ethno-national grounds and the lack
of political consensus on how to deal with the
past. There also remains an insidious undercurrent of dissident loyalist (Protestant) and
republican (Catholic) activities aimed at vulnerable communities, where those factions exercise
greatest influence.
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TABLE 1 Timeline of Atlantic’s Work in Northern Ireland

1993–95

No political
settlement

Atlantic makes its first grant in Northern Ireland (from Dublin
office), for low-risk, cross-community peace-building work.

Downing Street
Declaration

Chuck Feeney negotiates with Sinn Fein (republican party) on
funding a Washington office to promote a political alternative
to violence.

IRA cease-fire
1998
2001–02

2003–14

Atlantic establishes in office in Belfast.

Good Friday/Belfast
Agreement

A shift in Atlantic’s work supports higher-risk reforms in
policing, justice, and dealing with the legacy of the past.

Northern Ireland
Assembly suspended

Atlantic supports building research capacity in higher
education.

2007: Power-sharing
Assembly restored
2014: Stormont
House Agreement

Atlantic’s role is in cementing peace through interventions
in aging; children and youth; and reconciliation and human
rights.
Atlantic partners with the Northern Ireland government.

2014–present

Fresh Start political
agreement on power
sharing

Atlantic’s Belfast office closes (2016).
A strategic decision by its board will end all Atlantic grantmaking by 2016 and close it by 2020.

Virtually all of Atlantic Philanthropies’ work in
Northern Ireland can be traced back to Chuck
Feeney’s overarching desire to help build a lasting, sustainable peace and to reconcile deeply
divided communities. Feeney’s distress over
the violence in Northern Ireland became particularly acute on Nov. 8, 1987, when an IRA
bomb placed at a British war memorial killed 11
people attending a remembrance service in the
town of Enniskillen, close to his ancestral home.
Feeney saw the gruesome aftermath on television while in London and said that he wanted
to see peace, in his lifetime, in Northern Ireland
(O’Clery, 2007). Starting in 1990, Atlantic began
making grants in Northern Ireland, for the first
five years from its Dublin office. At a time of
intense and continuing political violence, funding
opportunities were limited. Atlantic supported
noncontroversial cross-community and crossborder contact and dialogue aimed at broadening political debate (Atlantic Philanthropies,
2015). Throughout more than 2 1/2 decades

of grantmaking in Northern Ireland, Atlantic
Philanthropies sought to address the legacy of
violent conflict that prevented movement toward
reconciliation, stability, and the protection of
human rights. (See Table 1.)

Atlantic Philanthropies
in Northern Ireland
The role of Atlantic Philanthropies in Northern
Ireland has received almost no attention in the
literature. Jung, Harrow, and Phillips examined community foundations across the U.K.,
which they define “as independent philanthropic
organisations working in a specific geographic
area which build up a permanent collection of
endowed funds contributed by many donors”
(2013, p. 411; see also, Daly, 2008). The only
foundation referenced in Northern Ireland,
Community Foundation of Northern Ireland
(CFNI), makes grants to meet a wide variety
of needs in its service area. While recognizing
The Foundation Review // 2017 Vol 9:1 25
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FIGURE 1 Atlantic Philanthropies’ Grants in Northern Ireland: 1991–2015
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Source: Atlantic Philanthropies (2015)

the absence of high-net-worth donors in
Northern Ireland, Jung, et al. noted that the
position of CFNI was “greatly enhanced by
major funding from Atlantic Philanthropies”
(2013, p. 420) and the European Union’s Peace
and Reconciliation Fund. Beyond that, there
has been no in-depth academic examination of the significant role played by Atlantic
Philanthropies in Northern Ireland.
During the period 1991–2015, Atlantic
Philanthropies awarded 618 grants totaling about $603 million in Northern Ireland;
the average grant was around $976,000. (See
Figure 1.) To put the total grants provided
by Atlantic into perspective in the context of
public-sector spending, the Northern Ireland
public expenditure budget is around $12 billion
per year. Hence, over the lifetime of Atlantic
Philanthropies’ involvement in Northern Ireland
it has provided grants equal to approximately 3.6
percent of one year’s public expenditure budget.
26 The Foundation Review // thefoundationreview.org

In the areas of peace, reconciliation, and human
rights specifically, it spent almost $156 million,
or 26 percent of its total funding for Northern
Ireland. This was the largest percentage of its
spending, followed by grants to higher education, at 22.5 percent; children and young people,
at 16.8 percent; and aging, at 13.5 percent. The
remainder of the funding was spent on a variety of areas, including community development
and civic engagement, youth development, early
childhood development, and strategic learning
and evaluation.
Spending patterns in Northern Ireland reflected
the wider move by Atlantic Philanthropies from
2007-09 to support a social-justice framework
broadly characterized as focusing on the root
causes of inequality, which perpetuate disparities
in power and access and which can be addressed
only through systemic and institutional change
(LaMarche, 2009; Proscio, 2010, 2012). This
approach captured the mood of political change

Partnership With Government

Atlantic’s role in supporting a social-justice
model appeared at odds with the pattern of
spending in the field of American philanthropy (National Committee for Responsive
Philanthropy, 2003, 2005; Jagpal & Laskowski,
2011). Suárez’s research, for example, indicated
that larger private foundations were much less
likely to discuss social justice than public foundations for fear of “drawing attention to their
work by using potentially contentious language
like social justice and social change in their programming” (2012, p. 272). Conversely, those
foundations that mentioned “social justice or
social change in their programming reject the
legal and normative restrictions on social action,
sending signals to activist grant seekers that their
ideas and tactics are welcome”; as a consequence,
foundations become “institutional entrepreneurs, pushing the broader philanthropic
community to reconsider funding strategies and
acceptable priorities” (p. 273).
Although broadly informed by a social-justice
framework, it is perhaps a more accurate assessment that Atlantic Philanthropies adopted a
generic theory of change in Northern Ireland
that had unwritten principles: judiciously select
well-respected NGOs, set broad parameters
for the social changes sought, provide them
with resources to effect change, build their
capacity to advocate though the use of robust
evidence funded by Atlantic, and take their
pilot projects to scale. In that sense, the wider
theory-of-change agenda was to build from
the bottom up, and Atlantic’s role was, as one
Atlantic interviewee said, one of “leading from

behind” and “oiling the wheels of high-level
advocacy” where its positional and financial clout
added value to the work of NGO groups. There is
no consensus within Atlantic on whether such an
approach demonstrated clear intentionality or if
those loose parameters simply offered the space
for flexibility in the highly volatile political environment that is Northern Ireland. What became
clearer as Atlantic’s funding in Northern Ireland
shifted to reflect the wider concerns of building
peace is that it sought to “normalize” society
through tackling social and religious inequalities that had fueled the violence and left those
impacted by the conflict most vulnerable (Beirne
& Knox, 2014; Borooah & Knox, 2014). Atlantic
points to a range of successes across the thematic
areas it supported. (See Table 2.)
While these achievements cover a number of
issues, a set of core themes and approaches emerge
from the work of Atlantic Philanthropies. Atlantic
has always sought to build and consolidate peace
in Northern Ireland — from early support for
organizations involved in dialogue (former combatants) through challenging work with those
on the margins and on to large-scale partnership
investments in shared education. It sought ways
to use Atlantic’s unique position and perspective
to encourage moves toward a more peaceful and
stable society. As Atlantic staff envisioned how to
make lasting impact with its work, the final phase
of grantmaking in Northern Ireland, from 2014
onward, focused on working with government to
enshrine the most successful models the foundation’s grantees had helped develop. We examine
this exit strategy in some detail.

The Exit Strategy: Partnering
With Government
The interface between government and philanthropy has received limited attention in the
European literature. Smyllie, Scaife, and
McDonald (2011), for example, argue that for
some philanthropic organizations, the willingness of government to subsidize or fund projects
initiated by philanthropy is a measure of success. Whether this happens can depend on the
nature and form of the particular welfare state.
European foundations see value in partnering
The Foundation Review // 2017 Vol 9:1 27
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in Northern Ireland. The political settlement
synonymous with the Good Friday/Belfast
Agreement in 1998 resulted in a power-sharing devolved government, but there remained
many of the underlying issues that gave rise to
the conflict. As noted by Gara LaMarche, then
chief executive of Atlantic Philanthropies, how
the social framework applies in Northern Ireland
“might lead us to see all of our work through
the lens of whether it serves to perpetuate peace
through supporting emerging political and social
structures that encourage the integration of a
deeply divided society” (2009, p. 3).

Knox and Quirk

TABLE 2 Atlantic Philanthropies: Key Successes in Northern Ireland

Results

)		 Programs

of shared services were developed at hostile “interface” communities,
improving delivery on issues such as early years and parenting, cyber-bullying,
and youth engagement for many individuals and families.

)		 The

number of integrated schools and preschools (where Catholics and
Protestants are taught together) nearly doubled, from 49 to 90, and the number
of students being educated in integrated schools nearly tripled, from 7,000
to 21,000.

Reconciliation

)		 In

2016, some 325 schools (one-third of all schools) were actively involved in
shared education, engaging 17,000 pupils.

)		 The

shared-education model was replicated in the deeply divided societies
of Macedonia and Israel-Palestine, disseminating lessons learned from
Northern Ireland.

)		 Downing
)		

Human Rights

IRA cease-fire

)		 Chuck

Feeney negotiates with Sinn Fein (republican party) on funding a
Washington office to promote a political alternative to violence.

)		 Atlantic
)		 Good

Aging

Children and
Young People

Street Declaration

establishes in office in Belfast.

Friday/Belfast Agreement

)		 A

shift in Atlantic’s work supports higher-risk reforms in policing, justice, and
dealing with the legacy of the past.

)		 Northern
)		 Atlantic

Ireland Assembly suspended

supports building research capacity in higher education.

Source: Knox & Quirk, 2016

with the state; U.S. and U.K. foundations are
less inclined, although this is changing (Anheier
& Daly, 2006). Smyllie, et al. pose the question
of whether “this activity [partnership between
government and philanthropy] results in public policy development,” an area they argue is
currently unexamined (2011, p. 1141). Thümler’s
study of the role played by philanthropic foundations that co-operated with public actors in
school-improvement partnerships in Germany
and the U.S. highlighted “essentially symbolic
types of action that satisfy the social appetite
for reform while they spare their audiences
the impositions of ‘real’ change — instances of
‘successful failure’” (2011, p. 1112). Anheier and
Daly (2006, citing Prewitt, Dogan, Heydemann,
& Toepler, 2006) argue that while redistribution is linked to notions of charity, social and
28 The Foundation Review // thefoundationreview.org

public-policy change is associated with philanthropy — an area that is being given greater
attention in research. Overall, in a European
context, research on philanthropic/government
partnership working, from the paucity of published work, is therefore underdeveloped.
Atlantic Philanthropies took the strategic decision, as part of its legacy, that it would partner
with government to sustain and embed key
strands of the work it had supported in Northern
Ireland. However successful external interventions are, philanthropic funding cannot and
should not be a substitute for publicly funded
services for which the state often has a legal or
societal responsibility, whether as a safety net
provider for the most vulnerable or as a public
good. Atlantic’s programmatic strategies had
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FIGURE 2 Atlantic Philanthropies’ Signature Programs
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been about creating knowledge and evidence;
designing, implementing, and testing models;
and advocating for policy change rather than
funding large-scale service delivery. As Atlantic
moved to end its grantmaking by 2016, it wished
to see how the learning and practices it had supported could change or influence mainstream
state-run services.

Social Change (DSC), which offered an overarching policy mechanism to work across
government. The specific focus of Atlantic’s work
involved three signature programs launched by
the first minister and deputy first minister in
September 2014: early intervention, dementia,
and shared education, each of which had formed
part of Atlantic’s previous grantmaking portfolio.

Atlantic partnered with government via a
wider policy framework, entitled Delivering
Social Change (Northern Ireland Office of the
First Minister and Deputy First Minister, 2013),
which was established by the Northern Ireland
Executive branch to tackle poverty and social
exclusion through the combined efforts of several government departments. Atlantic’s plan
to partner with government therefore coincided with a period when the Northern Ireland
Executive feared it was proving difficult to
deliver cross-cutting outcomes that straddled
the individual portfolios of several departments.
In that sense, the evolution of the partnership
between Atlantic and the devolved government
in Northern Ireland was opportunistic rather
than strategic. Indeed, project leaders within
Atlantic had been negotiating with individual
departments before the emergence of Delivering

The total investment in these programs
amounted to $75.5 million; Atlantic
Philanthropies contributed about $28 million
of that investment and the remainder came
from the Office of the Minister and Deputy
First Minister and from government departments with a direct interest in their functions
(e.g., Education, Health, and Justice). The Early
Intervention Transformation Program tries
to transform mainstream public services by
enabling a shift to early intervention and prevention. The Dementia Together Program
contributes to the government’s regional strategy, Improving Dementia Services in Northern
Ireland. The Shared Education Signature
Program aims to scale up the number of schools
involved in sharing classes on a cross-community basis and in sharing resources and teachers
as a way of breaking down sectoral boundaries
The Foundation Review // 2017 Vol 9:1 29
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TABLE 3 Atlantic Philanthropies’ Partnership Programs With the Northern Ireland Government

Results

Partnering
With
Government
Funding

Aims

Early Intervention
Transformation Program
$36.7 million total
partnership funds

$7.73 million total
partnership funds

To transform mainstream
services by enabling a
shift to early intervention
and prevention through a
greater use of evidence
and focus on outcomes.

To develop the extent, frequency,
and continuity of meaningful
shared contact between peer
groups within cross-community
school partnerships. Aim is
to support sustained crosscommunity learning through
shared classes, but at the same
time for schools to retain their
own community identity.

To make a significant
contribution to the
regional dementia
strategy, which
promotes a holistic
model involving the
community, family,
caregivers and services
in support of people
with dementia.

Three work streams:

Funds high-quality programs
that provide opportunities for
shared-learning experiences
that directly support the delivery
of the curriculum. The program
also supports the professional
development of teachers and
school leadership to improve
the quality of sharing and
collaboration among schools.

Three work streams:

• Support families when
problems arise, before
need for statutory
involvement.

• A significant
improvement in
quality and quantity of
prevention and early
intervention services.
• Improved staff
development through
integrated teams.
• Mainstream resources
redirected to make
initiative sustainable.

• Develop human
capital, including skills
training for dementia
workforce.
• Provide respite, short
breaks, and support to
caregivers.
• Raise awareness and
provide information
and support about
dementia.

• Address the impact of
adversity on children.

Expected
Outcomes

Dementia Together
Program

$30 million total partnership funds

• Equip all parents with
the skills needed to give
their child the best start
in life.
Details

Shared Education Signature
Program

• Improved educational outcomes
and enhanced access to the
curriculum for all pupils involved
in shared education.
• Normalized peer-to-peer
cross-community relationships
built through regular contact
within mainstream education.
• Shared education as a
component of regular
inspection processes in schools
and strategic plans.

30 The Foundation Review // thefoundationreview.org

• The onset and
progression of
dementia in the
Northern Ireland
population is delayed.
• People with dementia
have the health and
social-care services
they need.
• People with dementia
live well in Northern
Ireland.

Partnership With Government

Stakeholder Views
Conception, Design, and Content

Having three signature programs operating
under the same Delivering Social Change policy
framework conceals some significant similarities
and differences. The Shared Education Signature
Program, for example, was largely seen as scaling up Atlantic’s antecedent Shared Education
Program. The Dementia Together Program
was unambiguously about working alongside
government to implement the regional strategy, Improving Dementia Services in Northern
Ireland (Northern Ireland Department of Health,
Social Services, and Public Safety, 2011). In so
doing, it carved out areas of work that would
add value to the implementation of the strategy: human capital development, respite care,
awareness raising, and delirium. The Early
Intervention Transformation Program (EITP),
on the other hand, could be considered a successor program to the work Atlantic had been doing
for the previous 10 years — improving outcomes
for children through early intervention. Much of
its work to date had been about testing, through
children’s NGOs, various preventive measures
early in the lives of children and whether they
produced better outcomes.
As one Atlantic respondent noted:
When we decided to work directly with government, each of the three strands had been doing
their own thing, negotiating directly with potential
government partners in terms of what we might
do. Delivering Social Change then came along and
that seemed to us to be a wrapper which could usefully provide a rubric for our work.

The design and content of the signature programs, however, attracted criticism from
external stakeholders. Those grantees previously
working on shared education detected a loss in
passion and commitment to its essence as the

Those grantees previously
working on shared education
detected a loss in passion and
commitment to its essence as
the effort became absorbed into
the public-sector bureaucracy.
effort became absorbed into the public-sector
bureaucracy. In the Shared Education Program’s
original conception, creativity and risk-taking
were encouraged and, in the spirit of learning
from errors and rethinking practice, schools
were not criticized for making mistakes. While
probity of spending was important, accountability tended to focus on outcomes — what
had been achieved in the schools. Inevitably
those working outside the system on shared
education felt a sense of loss when it became
mainstreamed. Beyond the specifics of this program, moving from pilots to scale can result in
a perceived or real diminution of core content
(Ross, 2014).
The design of the dementia program was criticized for failing to take sufficient account of
existing provisions and, in some cases, duplicating what was already there. The slow pace
of the program was linked to what one NGO
interviewee described as “the clunkiness of the
system, particularly around commissioning, procurement, and recruitment processes, which [is]
exacerbated when a number of public bodies are
involved.” However, most criticism by former
grantees was leveled at the early-intervention
program, for a “lack of coherence.” Complaints
took a number of forms: interventions in which
Atlantic had invested significantly not appearing to any extent in the signature program; the
number of pilots in a program whose purpose
was perceived by former grantees as taking proof
of concepts to scale; the absence of due diligence
applied to partnering with government compared with what had been required of NGOs
who worked with Atlantic; and the seemingly
The Foundation Review // 2017 Vol 9:1 31
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that reflect wider divisions in society. (See Figure
2 and Table 3.) We consider in some detail the
views of stakeholders operating within and outside the philanthropy-government partnership
to deliver these three Atlantic Philanthropies
exit programs.
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An example to illustrate
the problems around
implementation came from
shared education. The Shared
Education Signature Program
faltered at the outset as its
introduction became entangled
with a trade union dispute
over academic assessment.
From this stuttering start the
SESP has begun to gather
momentum, but external
interviewees expressed the
view that its implementation
is being carried out in the most
minimalist way.
lower priority of evidence as a consideration in
program work.
Officials disagreed with these criticisms:
What we are now looking at are projects that draw
from existing practice and, by improving that
practice, become part of a systemic change process
going forward — antenatal and postnatal pathways involving holistic support from midwives and
health visitors respectively in the EITP programme
is a case in point. This is changing the system.

It is also worth pointing out that while the EITP,
with an investment of about $37 million, is the
largest of the three signature programs, Atlantic
Philanthropies makes a contribution of approximately one-third of the overall budget ($12
million). It is not therefore unreasonable for contributing departments to promote ideas that they
deem worthy of support rather than see the EITP
32 The Foundation Review // thefoundationreview.org

as simply a vehicle to take Atlantic’s prior interventions to scale. Officials also disliked some of
the branded early-childhood programs supported
by Atlantic that required licensing and the use of
copyrighted training materials. Moreover, DSC
expenditure overall is relatively small. As one
civil servant pointed out:
Year-on-year, going back to 2012, we should not
lose sight of the fact that DSC expenditure is less
than 1 percent of public spending — it’s tiny. Even
if you want the “tail to wag the dog,” you have a
very small tail on a very big dog, so it needs to be
kept in perspective.

Implementation

The key concern raised by external stakeholders
on implementation was that the signature programs were being treated like “an initiative, a
project, or a time-limited intervention.” In other
words, they did not have confidence that the
implementation process to date offered reassurance on mainstreaming. In part, this may have
been a feature of just how slow the process of
implementation had been up to that point, for a
variety of reasons. As one external stakeholder
pointed out,
When we were working on shared education, it
got to the point where every member of our team
would walk through fire to make this work. There
was a solid, unbending belief that this was the right
thing to do, buoyed up by a network of teachers
with the same ambition and commitment. The
energy that you draw from these experiences is
amazing. The reality is that it is never going to be
like that when it is part of the mainstream.

An example to illustrate the problems around
implementation came from shared education.
The Shared Education Signature Program
(SESP) faltered at the outset as its introduction
became entangled with a trade union dispute
over academic assessment. From this stuttering
start the SESP has begun to gather momentum,
but external interviewees expressed the view
that its implementation is being carried out in
the most minimalist way. As one NGO interviewee observed,

Partnership With Government

A key aspect of implementing the signature programs is the interagency work associated with
all three areas of work. Interviewees saw considerable merit in this idea and credited DSC as
the vehicle for making cross-departmental work
happen. As one official noted,
Given the unique mandatory political coalition
which we have in Northern Ireland, DSC offers
a vehicle in which a centre left and centre right
administration can approach diverse issues that
straddle their ambitions for growing the economy
while, at the same time, creating a more socially
just or equitable society. … For some DSC can
be an article of faith, others may see it in a more
mechanistic way — for me, it has afforded a real
opportunity to work horizontally.

The fact that departments made a financial commitment to the signature programs “guaranteed
their presence at the partnership table, if only for
accountability purposes,” an NGO interviewee
said. One criticism is that their commitment will
wane after activities have been commissioned,
but still allows them to point to their stake in
the signature programs. More fundamentally,
some interviewees criticized the kind of principal-agent model (Cairney, 2012) that prevailed
across interagency work, citing the relationship between the Department of Education
and Education Authority as one of a number of
examples: the Education Authority may act in
its own interests rather than the expectations of
the Department of Education, causing a principal-agent problem.
Mainstreaming and Sustainability

While a number of interviewees were vocally
critical of Atlantic Philanthropies’ move to
partnering with government (see Table 4), few
offered plausible alternatives. Rather, they provided nuanced comments on the process (more
explicit intentions on Atlantic’s part of what they
wanted from the partnership and greater overall

There was, in general, an
acknowledgment that to
mainstream provision,
services piloted by Atlantic’s
former grantees had to move
from external interventions
into recurrent spending by
government departments. The
issue for NGOs was how this
process happened in practice.
coherence within the three signature programs).
There was, in general, an acknowledgment that
to mainstream provision, services piloted by
Atlantic’s former grantees had to move from
external interventions into recurrent spending
by government departments. The issue for NGOs
was how this process happened in practice.
It is unlikely that the multiple activity streams
associated with the EITP can be fully resourced
into the future. What internal stakeholders argue
is that the working model of the EITP represents
an approach to transforming children’s services
through prevention and early intervention that
can be sustained and embedded in the way services are delivered. This approach attempts to
“change the way we do things” by posing the
following questions: Where is the evidence for
introducing the proposed practice change? What
is the transformation — which piece of the system are you going to change? How will this
change be sustained in the long term?
In shared education, there was an acceptance that
prior work under Atlantic’s Shared Education
Program had been hugely instrumental in securing significant policy and legislative gains that
would help in the process of sustainability. There
were concerns that shared education needed to
be given greater priority within the education
system if it was not to suffer the fate of integrated
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Shared education is about much more that shared
classes. It is about changing the way in which education is delivered by pushing the boundaries to
embrace joint-faith schools, federations, shared campuses, jointly appointed teachers, changes to the
area planning process, and a host of other things.
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TABLE 4 Stakeholder Views on Partnership With Government

Results

Delivering Social
Change

Internal (Government) Stakeholders

External (NGO) Stakeholders

Did not attract widespread
governmental support as a framework
for change.

Largely seen as unimportant in the
operation of the 3 signature programs.

Interagency
working

Departments with “skin in the game”
were attentive to where their resources
were going.

Government departments still find it
difficult to work cross-departmentally.
Government officials didn’t always
value third-sector involvement in
partnership arrangements.

“Do no harm” to
grantees

Not seen as particularly relevant — the
relationship between NGOs was with
Atlantic.

Atlantic more concerned with legacy
of partnering with government than
substance/ success of signature
programs.

Challenge role

Signature programs have a “top-down”
orientation owned and managed by
government departments.

Atlantic’s partnership with government
has muted its challenge function.
There is a need for an external voice.

Mainstreaming
and sustainability

There is a legitimate role for
departments to pilot ideas in signature
programs.

Fidelity of Atlantic pilots taken to scale
(Shared Education) in other areas
(Dementia and EITP). Where is the
change in professional practice?

Role of Atlantic
Philanthropies

“Keeping us honest” so that resources
are not absorbed into recurrent
expenditures.

Transformative influence in the way
government does things.

education (i.e., low growth in numbers, plateauing at under 7 percent of all school children).
Shared education is not fully embedded in the
system and political parties see it in very different ways — unionists (loosely Protestants) as
a route to a single, state education system, and
nationalists (loosely Catholics) as consistent
with the principles of parental choice. There is
also a concern, however, that infrastructure and
buildings — shared-education campuses — will
become synonymous with shared education and,
in so doing, its core principles will get lost.

and there is little sign of a follow-up strategy. As
one NGO interviewee put it:

The Dementia Together Program was designed
to complement the rollout of the regional strategy, Improving Dementia Services in Northern
Ireland. The portents for sustainability are not
good as pressure grows on public expenditure

What have been the general lessons learned so
far in partnering with government as an exit
strategy, based on Atlantic Philanthropies’ experience of working outside and more recently
inside the system?
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There is talk that the [dementia strategy implementation group] will be stood down, which is a
worrying development, on the basis that if we don’t
have another strategy, then there is no need for an
implementation group. My concern is that when
Atlantic’s money goes we could lose the significant
gains we have made to date.

Lessons Learned

Partnership With Government

• Bureaucracies. Public bureaucracies are slow,
cumbersome, and must adhere to strict
rules of accountability in spending taxpayers’ money. In partnering with the public
sector, external agencies have to accept that
their funding becomes partly subject to
the same exigencies, although foundations
have the power to set and hold expectations because of the resources they commit
to partnering with government. Hence, it
becomes frustrating when procurement
or staffing processes suck the momentum
out of opportunities when, previously, philanthropic funding could be deft and fleet
of foot. Somewhat perversely, however,
government partners have used Atlantic’s
involvement as a way of bringing pressure
to bear on other parts of the public sector,
either to leverage pre-agreed resources or to
prompt action. Such is the inertia in some
parts of the bureaucracy that an external
agent can, through its resources, be used to
kick-start public agencies.
• The change process. Effecting change in
the public sector is fraught with difficulties for myriad reasons. The particular
experience of Atlantic Philanthropies in
Northern Ireland was at the level of policy
implementation. Early negotiations around
partnership arrangements tended to take

place at the strategic level with parent government departments in a particular area
(e.g., Education, Health, Justice), but the
responsibility for rolling out the programs
lay with government agencies or armslength bodies. Departments often adopted
a principal-agent role and, as a result,
implementation bodies did not wholly own
the signature programs or fully endorse
what Atlantic wanted from them. The significant lesson for external funders is to
recognize the importance of managing
public-policy networks, or what Osborne
(2010) describes as new public governance
that is “both a product of, and a response
to, the increasingly plural and fragmented
nature of policy implementation and service delivery” (p. 9). There should also be
some recognition of the problems associated with systemwide change in the U.K.
public sector, best illustrated by Pettigrew,
Ferlie, and McKee (1992), who highlighted
the factors most likely to create a receptive
context for change.
• Relationships with government. Partnering
with government has the potential to
change relationships. Working as an external funder allowed Atlantic to support
NGOs in developing alternative public-service delivery models with accompanying
evidence of their effectiveness. These
organizations then advocated for policy
change based on proof-of-concept ideas.
In some cases, this pitted NGOs against
the public-sector status quo by challenging existing professional practice. In fact,
Atlantic encouraged and incentivized much
more than this. It supported organizations
in developing advocacy campaigns that
would “take on” public-sector organizations
with the aim of changing public policy and/
or introducing legislation. By association,
Atlantic could have been perceived as a
policy agitator at best, or, at worst, a thorn
in the side of government. Moving to partner with government changed the nature of
that relationship, although not its history.
Atlantic’s capacity to be indirectly critical
of government through NGOs it previously
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• Expectations. External funders may have
high expectations of what can be achieved
with their resources. From 1991 to 2015,
Atlantic awarded grants totaling more
than $600 million in Northern Ireland, or
3.6 percent of one year’s public spending.
This is not to minimize the level of funding
involved: far from it. The key learning point
for external funders is to be very targeted
and selective in areas where interventions
are most likely to influence change. So,
although Atlantic’s overall financial commitment set against the total public-sector
budget appeared small, within the three
targeted areas — shared education, early
intervention, and dementia — the funding
was significant and its track record in modeling professional practice was impressive.
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Philanthropic money allows for
experimentation, creativity,
permission to get it wrong,
and learning from these
experiences. The public sector
does not easily embrace this
approach; the career trajectory
of officials and ambitious
politicians can be tied to the
success of policies.
funded has, of necessity, been muted. Its
new role, however, offered insider status, a
working relationship with senior officials,
and, as a result, influence at the highest
level of decision-making to advocate for
mainstreaming.
• Relationships with NGOs. Not only do relationships with government change, but
those with erstwhile NGO grantees can
alter for the worse. In part this may be
explained by the fact that NGOs have lost a
valuable funding stream and, hence, there
is an element of sour grapes. However, it
is also true that NGOs, whose passion for
their work helped inform the very changes
now being supported in government, get
lost in the routine of what officials might see
as “yet another project.” NGOs have handed
over their “baby,” and look with a very critical eye at the adoptive government parents.
Moreover, NGOs witness what they would
see as Atlantic exercising much less rigor
in selecting government as a partner than
they had experienced at the outset in their
relationship. There will, of course, always
be criticisms from NGOs that government
officials do not exercise the same personal
investment and level of commitment to the
transferred work. When pressed for alternatives, however, NGOs accept — albeit
36 The Foundation Review // thefoundationreview.org

reluctantly — that services cannot be sustained outside the remit of the public sector
and their role must be to ensure fidelity to
the good-practice models they helped to
develop. For Atlantic, DSC came along at a
time when it was looking for a way to partner with government, and its standards of
due diligence, given the partner, may well
have been lower than those expected of
NGOs — a double standard, from the perspective of former grantees.
• External voice. This weakening as an
external advocate is borne out in the role
Atlantic plays in the governance of the
signature programs. While Atlantic clearly
deserves a seat at the oversight board by
dint of its significant financial contribution,
civil servants can be resentful of external
“meddling” their work. Even those officials
who accept Atlantic’s presence can reduce
its role to one of “keeping us honest” —
ensuring that philanthropic money isn’t
absorbed into revenue spending in straitened financial times. Hence, having taken
philanthropic money, some officials resist
external funders playing anything more
than a prosaic role. The lesson for Atlantic
here was to make its presence felt not only
by virtue of its financial contribution, but
also in the expertise it brought to the table
in substantive public-policy areas. The
wider lesson for foundations may be that
governments can seek to marginalize their
influence but take their money — not with
malign intent, but simply by absorbing it
into the financial black hole that represents
the public purse.
• Risk aversion. It is not surprising that with
mainstreaming external interventions
comes the prospect of working with public officials and elected politicians who are
risk averse. Philanthropic money allows for
experimentation, creativity, permission to
get it wrong, and learning from these experiences. The public sector does not easily
embrace this approach; the career trajectory
of officials and ambitious politicians can be
tied to the success of policies. Civil servants,
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• The role of evidence. Despite the overt
commitment by the public sector to evidence-informed policymaking, in the cut
and thrust of everyday life and the fluid
political environment in which they operate, officials and politicians can be quite
short-termist in their need for and use of
evidence. This is different from the external
interventions funded by Atlantic that placed
an emphasis on producing a strong evidence
base to substantiate the effectiveness of
the work, including funding randomized
controlled trials over several years. This
could well be seen as a luxury that the public sector can ill-afford in terms of time and
resources. External funders, therefore, offer
a robust evidence base that can be persuasive in making the case for policy change,
and find political advocates who can promote common interests.
• Sustainability. Clearly an important element for philanthropic organizations in
partnering with government is to sustain the interventions, principles, and
approaches they have funded. It would
be relatively easy for government departments, without intent, to simply absorb

philanthropic funding and continue with
the status quo. The question for external
funders is how best to position themselves
to ensure the optimum opportunity for
long-term sustainability. One way could be
to demonstrate cost savings to hard-pressed
government departments. The experience
from the three signature programs has
varied. In one case, sustainability has been
pursued through successfully advocating
for a legal commitment to shared education
and an education policy that rolls out that
commitment. In the case of early intervention, sustainability has been promoted by
changing professional practice and doing
things differently — and not necessarily
with additional resources — to make public services more effective. With dementia,
the approach has been to assist government
in the implementation of its strategy while
testing models of respite care. The learning
for external funders is that approaches to
sustainability can be multifaceted and context specific, but that how to mainstream
their interventions must always be a key
element in any funding strategy.

Conclusions
None of these limitations should be read as
reasons for philanthropy not to partner with
government. Rather, they are set out as reflective learning and potential issues to be aware of.
Indeed, partnering with government offers real
opportunities to embed models that have been
developed externally and moved to the mainstream. There are senior officials in government
receptive to change, open to the challenge of
doing things differently, and grateful for external funding that affords them the opportunity
for experimentation and innovation. Some are
simply weighed down by the bureaucracy in
which they operate and find it difficult to change
course. Others seize the opportunity, value the
evidence base of external funders, and promote
change internally.
What is the reflective learning for Atlantic
Philanthropies from partnering with government so far? First, the evolution and nature
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of course, must be guardians of public
money and their actions can be restricted in
the knowledge that they may at some point
be called on to publicly account for how and
why they took a particular course of action.
That said, the spirit of “delivering social
change” offered an opportunity for external
funders to promote innovation and support
ways of changing professional practice. In
public-policy theory, these circumstances
might be described as “a policy window of
opportunity in which ‘policy entrepreneurs’
(Atlantic Philanthropies) frame issues and
promote their solutions to policy makers
or ‘solutions chasing problems’” (Kingdon,
1984, p. 174). So, notwithstanding a policy
environment in which risk aversion is the
norm, there are policy windows that allow
external funders to influence change with
policies and programs that are demonstrably effective.

Knox and Quirk

Results

of the partnership may have been different in
circumstances where Atlantic had not been a
spend-down foundation. A broader time frame
would have been available to forge relationships
with government officials who were conscious
that Atlantic was in spend-down mode. This
could have encouraged officials to be less receptive, adopting an “Atlantic is leaving the stage”
attitude. Where Atlantic encountered dyed-inthe-wool officials, conservative in their opinions
and resistant to the whole idea of external
intervention, it simply circumvented and went
directly to politicians. The risk in such a strategy
is to unintentionally antagonize officials who
ultimately are there to implement government
policy. While this approach is undesirable, it
has sometimes resulted in a complete volte-face
by officials faced with policies that have been
put in place by their political masters; a longer
time frame may have prevented such an outcome. Second, Atlantic underestimated the pace
of change in partnering with government and
overestimated its ability to effect systemwide
change. This was made more problematic in a
political context where power-sharing arrangements accentuated ministerial fiefdoms and
made cross-departmental cooperation problematic. Third, Atlantic had developed a strong
evidence base illustrating the success of its pilot
projects and advocated for direct implementation
through a partnership with government. Here
again, Atlantic underestimated the difficulties
in taking pilots to scale within a complex public-sector system. Finally, the degree of negativity
from NGOs and erstwhile grantees toward the
foundation’s partnership with government came
as a surprise and disappointment to Atlantic. It
had anticipated that, at worst, its actions would
“do no harm” and, at best, that NGOs would
be more understanding of the need for mainstreaming. Atlantic was therefore unprepared for
the feelings of abandonment expressed by some
grantees, who may well have developed a degree
of unintentional dependency simply because of
the funding stream they have enjoyed. But grantees’ passion for their work and a desire to witness
systemic changes were factors far more profound
than the loss of Atlantic as a funding source.
38 The Foundation Review // thefoundationreview.org

While it is no road map to effecting social change
in the public sector, this article has highlighted
where the tensions exist and ways in which
Atlantic Philanthropies is attempting to address
them. It is too soon to conclude if the partnership between Atlantic and the government of
Northern Ireland will lead to embedding external interventions into the mainstream of public
services, but there is now good will on both sides
to make this happen.
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